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In cybernetics, the basic assumption is that systems aim for control. But what and how are they controlling? I 
differentiate two categories of control: internal and external control. In external control, one starts from 
outside, and tries to determine the environment completely. While with internal control, one’s own aspirations 
are taken as a starting point, and useful synergies with the environment are sought. I’ll define these concepts in 
cybernetic terms, and argue why they are not necessary related. There are two aspects in this difference. The 
first lies in the locality: is there an aim for global control, or only for control in the immediate environment? 
There is also a difference in what one tries to change. An agent could adapt its links, or try to change either the 
methods or the goals of its neighbors. Several of these cases will be further explored by giving an existing model 
that falls under this circumstances. All of these models will be put into an overarching framework. The model 
of controllability is a model about global control, while the others model local control, based on neural 





A growing number of people feel like they don’t have control over their own life, that the path they 
should follow is already predetermined. They have the impression somebody or something is 
controlling them, and they would like to have control over their own life. But often it is presented as 
if you only have two choices: either dominate, or being dominated. In speaking about control, there 
is no difference made between being in control over your own life, and controlling others. This is 
why I introduce the concepts of internal and external control. If one attempts to control its own 
situation, to fulfill its aspirations, I speak of internal control. External control means one attempts to 
determine environmental behavior. The goal is to control everything completely.  
External control can be used in order to get internal control. But I argue that this is not the only way: 
it is possible to change something without controlling others. One can find synergies in her 
environment, so that he can develop to the fullest without standing in the way of other people’s 
development. Thus, there are different strategies to get internal control. 
If one uses external control, one keeps things out of their natural state, the equilibrium state, for its 
own profit. People are pushed in a state where someone wants them to be, which is unnatural for 
them, and which they often don’t want. This requires constant energy to keep this state. 
The second method is that one considers that people can take different paths in life, that there are 
different equilibria. How their life develops depends on what they encounter and whether they are 
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empowered. Thus, there are different bifurcation points in one’s life, where going one way isn’t 
always clearly better than the other. People can then align their paths so that one’s path is beneficial 
for the other. One just interacts with others so that they have the possibility to take the other path 
and are empowered to do so. An example is the distribution of leaflets with information about a 
certain oppressive practice, and ways one can resist to it. People have the choice to ignore it, but at 
least they now know about it, and are empowered to do something against it. This is something 
completely different than telling people what they should do.  
An example of the different strategies for control, is the difference between traditional agriculture 
and permaculture. In traditional agriculture, the farmer tries to control the land completely: he 
removes all the organisms that don’t give him food directly, often just keeping one crop which he 
tries to optimize to get as much as possible out of it. This requires constant energy: he’ll need 
fertilizer because the soil will get depleted from having only one crop that takes all its nutrients, and 
he’ll need some products and machines to keep the weeds and insects away. In permaculture, the 
whole ecosystem is kept. One tries to interfere as little as possible in all constituent sub-ecosystems. 
But different kinds of ecosystems are possible, depending on small differences. The idea is that you 
watch and learn from how nature works, and build an ecosystem where you also get out what you 
want. The system will maintain itself, thus it could in theory be sustained indefinitely, in a 
permanent agriculture, hence the name.  
Another easier and more fictive example is the different ways you can deal with rain. You could just 
accept it, "It’s raining, I’m getting wet, and I can do nothing about it". Or you could try to influence 
the weather. But you can also build a shelter. In this way, you gain control over your life without 
having to control the rain. 
A related concept is ’Risk board mentality’: the belief that contact between people who are different 
must result in a missionary relationship, with one converting the other (Gelderloos, 2007). 
Gelderloos argues that there can be a mutual influence, it’s not either dominate or being dominated. 
You don’t have to conquer the world to get control over your life. 
This work can also be related to the idea of antifragility (Taleb, 2012). A system is called antifragile if 
it gets stronger after a shock. The principle is that one makes the system more antifragile, but one 
doesn’t predetermine how it should behave exactly. With a strict plan, a blueprint, of how everything 
should be, the system will be pretty fragile: as soon as something is a little bit different than planned, 
everything falls apart. This is an argument for why aiming for external control could make a system 
more fragile.  
The concept of two categories of constraints applied by management processes (Stewart, 2014) is 
similar to these different strategies for control. Prescriptive constraints specify more or less precisely 
the particular outcomes that occur in the managed group. Evolvability resides in the manager, since 
the other entities mostly just do as they are told. With enabling constraints, the interests of group 
members get aligned with the interests of the group as a whole. Then, when an agent acts in its own 
self-interest, it is also in the interest of the group. The advantage of this type is that it uses the local 
knowledge and the diversity of the group. 
Stewart also cites Salthe (Salthe, 2013) who states that constraints can arise in two ways: upper-level 
constraints arise external to the dynamic of entities, while lower-level constraints are fixed, internal 
features of the interacting entities that can influence how entities behave. Both influence the 
dynamic, but they aren’t influenced in return, which is Stewart’s definition of power.  
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In the previous I always somehow assumed there was one agent wanting control. It is important to 
keep in mind that being controlled doesn’t necessarily have to happen by one agent. In "Perceptual 
control and social power"(McClelland, 1994), McClelland argues that social power is alignment. It is 
when lots of people align to the same goal, that it is difficult to do something different. Power thus 
doesn’t reside in one individual. 
Following, I will first explore how we can define internal and external control in cybernetic terms. 
Then I will put several models of control in a general framework, which is based on the model of 
Mesarovic (Mesarovic, Macko, & Takahara, 2000). The idea is that there are two aspects in the 
difference between internal and external control. First, there is a difference between acting locally or 
globally. The other difference lies in what one tries to change: either the links, methods or goals of 
other agents. The model of controllability implies an aiming for global control by adapting goals. The 
other models work with local control. In the model of self-organized control, one adapts its links, 
while in the last model one adapts the methods of its neighbors. 
2. What is internal and external control? 
Some branches of systems science focus on internal control, while others aim for external control. In 
the engineering approach, there is an agent (the engineer) outside the system, who puts a goal on 
the system and who manipulates the system so that it would reach the goal. This agent thus aims for 
external control - control over the environment. With second-order cybernetics came the 
autonomous approach: the goal came inside the agent, who acts in the environment in order to 
reach its goal. Subjectivity came into the picture, where systems could self-organize and pursuit their 
own goals. Here, internal control became more important (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001). 
The general scheme in cybernetics is a system that gets certain inputs (perception), which he 
transforms into an output (action) in order to reach goal(s). This output than changes the input the 
system receives from the environment. Note however that this is completely symmetric: system and 
environment could simply be switched, both are transforming inputs into outputs. But in general it 
is assumed there is some asymmetry: one (the system) is more powerful than the other (the 
environment) (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001). But what does power mean in this context? Inputs and 
outputs are affected in a mutual way, and it is a priori difficult to say whether an output is changed 
because it is manipulated by an input, or because it wants to change this input.  
  
Figure 1: Coupled system 
To answer this question, we consider such a coupled system (see figure 1). We have two agents,  
and , both with goal(s)  and .  sends a signal  to , which sends back a signal .  
transforms this input  into a , which he then uses to create the output. If  is just one value,  
can be seen as the difference between the real value and the goal state, but in general  can be seen 
as the part that matters. This means: that part of the variables of the input that  cares about, in the 
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composition he cares about. For example, he might want to have one variable bigger than another, 
but doesn’t care how much the difference is.  plays the same role for . 
An agent would feel in power if the actions he performs can affect what he cares about, this is . 
This can be seen as a definition of internal control (IC):  
 (1) 
By this, I mean the difference in result given a standard difference in action. Off course, this depends 
on the kind of action an agent performs: it might be that changing one variable doesn’t have any 
effect, while changing another does, or that only after a certain threshold an action has effect. An 
agent will feel powerless if any action he does, gives the same result, thus if he doesn’t have internal 
control. 
On the other hand, an agent has power over another agent if it can influence the state of the other 
agent, as in the state that matters for the agent. We then say that the agent has external control, 
which we thus define as:  
 
Again, this depends on what kind of actions are performed, and  can also be affected in different 
ways. There is an assumption here that we know what is important for , that  is known.  
However, we can also look at everything from the perspective of what happens to . We thus look at 
the external control exercised on , this is , and the internal control of  (1).  can 
here be seen just as an environment, with some unknown complex dynamics, and without the 
assumption that we know what is important for  (or even that there is a ). We can than look 
what a standard difference in action from  does. This  will give rise to a difference in the input 
of , this is . This input will change the  of  in an amount given by . This  is the same 
in  and . Thus if , . In words, if a small difference in action of 
 can lead to big changes in the input it receives, then that agent has more internal control than the 
external control exerted on it. On the other hand, if , then . Thus, if one’s 
actions doesn’t lead to a lot of results, he’ll have less internal control than the external control put on 
him.  
Internal and external control are not necessary related, as following example shows (see figure 2). 
Consider a coupled system, where agent  tries to control variable , while  wants to control .  
puts the variables at state  and sends this to , who vice versa transforms it into . As 
a classical cybernetic system, each agent moves the variable it is controlling closer to its goal state, 
for  this means , with  and  a certain constant, and analogous for 
. But what do the agents do with the variable that doesn’t matter for them?  
First consider the case where they put this variable at a certain constant, thus  and . 
Then, both agents have no internal control at all: no matter the action they do, the difference from 
the goal state will remain constant, for  this is . They do however have complete 
external control: they can completely determine the  of the other, by choosing the constant they 
send. Thus  (considering a change in action of the second variable). 
Note that this way of acting could even be with the best intentions, to put the variable to a state the 
other agent prefers. But since an agent has imperfect knowledge of the goal(s) of another agent, he 
won’t succeed completely, and even if he does, the other agent will still feel like he’s not in control. 
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Now consider on the other extreme the case where the agents don’t affect the variable they don’t 
care about. Thus , and . Here, agents have complete internal control: a change in 
action will affect their . . They however don’t have any external 
control: they don’t have any effect on the  of the other. Actually, we can see this as a completely 
decoupled system, where two agents simply try to control another variable, independent from each 
other. 
  
   
Figure 2: An example to show how internal and external control is not always related. Both agents control a different 
variable (upper). In the first case (lower left), they put the other variable to a constant, which results in external, but no 
internal control. In the second case (lower right), they don’t affect the other variable, which result in internal, but no 
external control. 
 
3. Different strategies for control 
This clarified what I mean with internal and external control. Now, I’d like to use a multi-agent 
model to show in which ways agents can have internal or external control.  
  
Figure 3: Direct versus indirect acts.  is an agent, living in a society. The agent on the left tries to reach its goals indirectly. 
It will try to influence the goal(s) of the state. This state tries to reach its goals by acting in the society. The problem with 
this approach is that some goals of the state will also influence the goal of the agent. And since the state is a much bigger 
structure than an individual agent, the change in the agent will be much more significant. The agent on the right acts 
directly in an attempt to reach its goals, by acting in the society  
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On the one hand, the difference between these strategies lies in the locality: one could develop local 
actions, or one could attempt to influence the global system. 
Traditional politics still assumes people should get into power to impose their societal vision. People 
try to get global control to fulfill their needs. Prefigurative politics means someone already tries to 
put hir societal vision into practice today, i.e. goals and methods get aligned. Thus, aiming for a 
world where no-one is controlled, shouldn’t happen by trying to control others. Anarchists１ using 
direct action apply this principle. Direct action means you directly act against a certain oppressive 
dynamic, in contrast to, for example, asking politicians to do something about it. An example is 
blocking an immigration detention center, so that they can’t expel anyone that day. 
With direct action, one tries to reach its goals directly. While working through the state means 
someone tries to influence the goals of the state, so that they include his goal, or so that his goals 
and the ones of the state are more mutual. Figure 3 shows this difference. 
On the other hand, the difference lies in the way one acts, i.e. what one tries to change. An agent 
could adapt its links, or try to change either the methods or the goals of its neighbors. Adapting 
one’s links means moving to a different environment. For example, someone can try to find friends 
who share ideas and like what he likes, or he can try to convince his friends to do what he wants to 
do. Another example looks to communication. Some people spread a message with the aim of 
convincing. They intend to change the goals of other people. While other people spread their ideas 
to create a dialogue: by getting inspiration and feedback, both parties can improve their thoughts. 
They change their connections in order to collaborate with the most interesting people, and improve 
the methods of their neighbors.  
But these three ways are related, and it might be able to put them on a continuum. Changing one’s 
links affect the possibilities her neighbors have, the methods they can use. And methods can be seen 
as putting a subgoal to reach a bigger goal. The question is then which goals are fundamental for an 
agent, and which are just means to an end. Probably this isn’t that black-and-white, goals can be 
more or less important. 
I will now give a general framework of a multi-agent model, which I will apply to existing models. 
These can be seen as toy models of the different strategies of control introduced above.  
4. Generalization 
The framework I develop here is a generalization of the model of Mesarovic (Mesarovic et al., 2000). 
His model works with a hierarchical system where there is a ’top’ and a ’bottom’, and it differentiates 
between a process and a control system. I won’t do this, I’ll work with a general model of connected 
agents. An agent gets certain input, this can come from other agents in the form of coordination or 
feedback, or could come from ’outside’, from the environment. It transforms this into an output, 
which can be a coordination input for other agents, or some general output going outside.  
There is also a feedback signal created for every coordination input it received, which it sends back 
to the agent that send the coordination input. An agent uses his inputs and outputs to create a 
feedback signal. 
Thus, an agent sends a certain signal, called coordination input, to influence its neighbors. It gets 
back a feedback signal as information of how well it succeeded in its attempts. We’ll work with a 
directed network. The inputs and outputs of an agent  are shown in figure 4. A link between agent  
and agent , means  sends a coordination input  to , where  is the specific coordination 
input, and  is the set of possible coordination inputs from  to . Consequently,  sends a feedback 
signal  to . Further on, it’s possible an agent receives some input from its environment  and 
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send some output  outside. I’ll consider these also as coordination inputs and outputs, thus I 
define the set of coordination inputs as  and the coordination output as 
２.  is the feedback an agent receives, while  is the feedback an 
agent sends. Thus the functions to create a coordination and feedback signal are the following: 
 (2) 
 (3) 
An agent uses its coordination and feedback inputs to create a coordination output (2), and takes all 
of this to generate a feedback signal (3). 
  
Figure 4: Inputs and outputs of an agent in the general model 
3.1.1  Coordinability 
The idea of coordinability is that we want that all agents find a solution to their decision problem. 
We’d further want this solution to be stable: we don’t want that there is only a solution for an 
insignificant amount of time.  
To introduce this decision problem, we decompose  into two subsystems:  
 (4) 
 (5) 
so that , by first applying  and then , we get back the original function  (2). The idea is 
that for every input , there is a decision problem . The solution(s) to this problem 
are defined by  (4)). This is thus a set of possible solutions, it could be empty or contain 
multiple solutions. This solution is then implemented to create a coordination output, given the 
feedback it received (by (5)). We define following predicate to say that something is a solution to a 
decision problem: 
 
First consider the case where there is no feedback. Then we define stable internal coordinability as:  
 (6) 
where ３. This means that there exists a solution to all decision problems given a certain 
input (the part ), and this input is constructed given these solutions (the part 
). This last part makes that we have a stable solution, if we omit the condition , we get a 
weak version of internal coordinability.  
If each decision problem has one solution (thus  is a function), condition (6) is equal to:  
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Now, with feedback, stable internal coordinability is defined as follows:  
(8) 
where ４. This thus means that there is a solution and feedback signal, such that the 
feedback signal remains stable (the part ), and that the coordination input that 
gets used, is constructed from the solution (thus that there is stability for the coordination inputs, 
this is the part ). 
If the ’s are functions, (8) is equivalent to: 
(9) 
Now, it is also possible that we want that a certain given problem  has a solution. We can assume 
the solutions to this problem are in . There is a function  (part of the ’s will do 
this). We can then define stable coordinability relative to a problem  by adding the condition 
. 
3.2  Application to the controllability of complex networks 
I would now like to apply this framework to the theory of the controllability of complex networks 
(Liu, Slotine, & Barabasi, 2011). The idea here is that you try to control a network by sending certain 
inputs to certain nodes. This is thus a model of global control by adapting the goals of agents. Liu et 
al. searched for a minimal set of nodes which one has to control to have control over the whole 
network. In this model, each node  has a value  which got influenced by the values of their 
neighbors and the control input. This happens by the following update:  
(10) 
where  is the link weight between  and , and  is the link weight from the controller  to 
５. Liu et al. argue that the exact values of  and  don’t matter for the controllability. We can write 
this into our framework by taking , the output of , also as input of . We take . An agent 
sends the same output to all agents. We got:  
 
where , ,  and . Thus  is a function of  and . 
 
Liu et al. define controllability as being able to put the network in any desired state. It isn’t necessary 
however that this is a steady state. We can try to steer to this state by choosing certain inputs. We 
call this version weak controllability, and it can be defined as a form of weak coordinability, namely 
when there is weak coordinability relative to all decision problems, thus 
 
Notice that the implementer is here the identity function; the solution  of the decision problem 
gets send out.  is a function (equal to ), thus the first part is actually always true, though we 
Is external control important for internal control? Evo Busseniers 
 
Journal of Sociocybernetics 14 (2015)   9 
 
would like the  to come from a previous step. The second part states that we should find an  that 
is a solution to the decision problem, for all the decision problems. A decision problem is a subset of 
possible ’s, thus this is equivalent of stating it’s true for all ’s.  
The theory of controllability found out that you have controllability if each node has its own direct 
superior, this can be another node or an input node. This leads them to the theorem that a minimal 
set of nodes you have to control is equal to the unmatched nodes in a maximum matching. 
The requirement that you should reach a stable state could however be useful. Reaching a desired 
state for only a millisecond, is often not what you want. I thus define stable controllability as: 
(11) 
We can again define this by seeing it as an overall decision problem. The solutions of the decision 
problem are in . It is a solution of the problem if it is equal to our predefined desired state. Thus, 
controllability means the following is true for all decision problems:  
 
Internal stable coordinability (from (7)) is here defined as:  
(12) 
which is thus less strong - there only needs to be one stable solution.  
Hence coordinability looks whether the agents can coordinate between each other, while 
controllability wants them to behave in a specific externally defined way. 
I’d now want to check whether there is stable controllability (11) in this model. Thus, we consider  
fixed for all . We find that we want to find ’s such that (10) is an equality, thus  
 
where we don’t consider , thus we put this at  again.  
A little bit of calculation, learns that if for a certain , , then we should have 
. Otherwise, we should define one  as depending on the others by the formula:  
 
Thus, each node for which  should have its own control input, which means almost all nodes 
should be controlled. 
If we take , we find a solution for stable internal coordinability (from (12)). 
This approach fits in the engineering approach of first-order cybernetics, where the goal is appointed 
to the system from the outside. The aim here is thus external control. The assumption is that there is 
a given and completely known complex network, and one wants to control its dynamics. 
3.3   Self-organized control 
I would now like to extend the above model to allow feedback. The idea is that we see the feedback 
as link weight. The link weight is changed so that the input an agent receives fulfills its desire more. 
The link weight  gives the strength of the connection between  and , this is changed depending 
on how useful the value of  is. I thus consider it as the feedback  that  sends to . This is thus a 
model where an agent changes his environment in order to get control. The agents in this model 
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hence have goals on their own, in contrast with the previous model. I model this by giving each 
agent a reference value . An agent wants to move its value  to the reference value. The updating 
of a value of an agent happens as above, except that I don’t allow any external input anymore (13). 
The coordination an agent sends is its value  multiplied with the link weight (14) (this operation 
thus happens with the sending agent instead of with the receiving agent). I consider two loops: an 
agent sends its updated value and the constructed feedbacks also to himself, so that its first output, 





The last formula (15) for the updating of the link weight comes from the theory of perceptron 
learning (Haykin, 1994). If the total input is too big ( ), the link weight (feedback) is weakened 
for positive inputs, and strengthened for negative ones, so that the total input becomes less. The 
opposite happens if the total input is too little. Figure 5 shows how these functions work. 
  
 
Figure 5: A graphical representation of the formula’s (13), (14) and (15) of self-organized control. 
Agent  combines its value  and the link weight  to generate a coordination signal . This 
input is used by agent  in the processes  and . In , the inputs agent  receives is combined with 
its value  to update this . In , this  is then compared with  to update the feedback signal 
. This feedback changes the link weight  between  and .  
I’d now like to know whether there is stable internal coordinability in this model. This is the case if 
there is a solution for the above equations (from (9)). Some calculation learns that there are two 
possible solutions. One is , then the feedback can be chosen at random. Another possibility 
is to take . If , any feedback will satisfy. If not, there is a . For , we 
can then take  at random, and then take  
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for every . 
This last solution seems most logical, namely that the agents want to have their values equal to their 
reference values. We can put this as an overall decision problem: . Then we get that the 
above solution is the only possible case of stable coordinability relative to this overall decision 
problem. 
Thus, we find that there is stable coordinability in this model, if we assume the feedback (link 
weight) isn’t bound to only positive numbers or only between  and . However, the fact that there is 
a solution, doesn’t necessary mean that this solution will be reached by this process. It might never 
get into this attractor. For example, if we take , none if the ’s will change, thus it won’t be 
able to reach a reference value if this value is different than zero. Also, if the learning parameter  is 
too high, agents might constantly overcompensate, thus never reach the reference value. 
Thus, also in a weak version, coordinability won’t always be reached. In which circumstances, it is 
and isn’t, remains an open question, though it is plausible that often it is reached, since the model is 
built so as to go to the solutions (the update of the feedback signal makes it closer to its reference 
value). 
This model is more in line with the autonomous approach of second-order cybernetics. Each agent 
has its own goal, which it tries to reach by adapting its links with other agents. In a social system, 
these links can be friendship ties, where on the internet it can represent how strong two people 
connect. For example, if you put an unwanted email in your spam folder and indicate that you don’t 
want to receive any of these messages anymore, your weakening your link with the sender. In this 
way, you give some feedback on how much an email is wanted. Connecting with people with whom 
you share interests and detach from people who block you in reaching your goals, is another 
example. 
3.4  Control by changing the method of your neighbors 
I now want to construct a model where agents try to influence the methods of their neighbors. I will 
base this on Perceptual Control Theory (McClelland, 2004). 
In perceptual control theory, an agent tries to control its perception , by trying to equalize it with a 
certain reference value  (16). But there are also other agents who try to control the same 
perception, with other reference values in mind, and the perception might also get disturbed by the 
environment  (17). Usually these disturbances are random, thus this isn’t much of a problem. The 
model thus looks like this:  
(16) 
(17) 
In this model, the perception will converge to an average of the reference values, where  represents 
the power an agent has. This can thus be a simple model of social power. If all the other agents have 
the same reference value, the one (or minority of) agent(s) with another reference value won’t be 
able to match its reference value. In general, this one control loop is part of a perceptual hierarchy, 
with different reference values which are controlled by a higher control loop. If there is conflict 
because a reference value is constantly not met, it will perturb this reference value until it is met. 
Thus, an agent will conform to the pressure of the group of all the same reference values. 
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Inspired by this model, I now construct a model where the idea is that one tries to influence your 
neighbors to send the right coordination input, by sending them certain feedback. We assume the 
coordination an agent  sends to  is constructed as follows:  
(18) 
Each agent  has a value  he wants to put as close as possible to its reference value .  is 
constructed as follows:  
(19) 
The way an agent tries to control its neighbors to send coordination which satisfies its needs 
(reference value) more, is by sending this feedback:  
(20) 
A shortcoming of this model is that the coordination input is assumed to be known and of a specific 
form, so that it satisfies our urge to control it. That’s why I want to generalize the model where we 
assume the coordination function is unknown, and we don’t even know how exactly this gets 
aggregated into . Thus we just assume  
 
with  some unknown function. Then we can still try to get control by looking how our  got 
affected by the  we have sent out ( we send the same feedback signal to all agents, thus we assume 
) . If there is a positive correlation, thus a bigger  results in a bigger , then we can use 
the same update mechanism as above. If there is a negative correlation however, we should do the 
opposite, subtracting instead of adding. We thus get the following formula’s:  
 
This still has some unrealistic assumptions though, because the aims and the methods got separated. 
The  and the output  send out are completely separated. We see what kind of consequences this 
has when we check whether there is stable internal coordinability (9). It’s difficult to check this for 
the general model, so I do this for the more specific model (thus (18),(19) and (20) should be 




One can easily choose ’s such that this is fulfilled.  
This model is again in line with the autonomous approach, where all agents have a goal they try to 
reach. Here however, they do so by controlling the methods of other agents. In a social context, you 
can see this as someone who want others to say what he wants to hear, and do as he wants. As long 
as these things are independent from the goals of the person asked, this may well work. But because 
of this decoupling, the result is often artificial, where people are just saying what one wants to hear, 
but without being really committed to it. 
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4.  Conclusion 
I first examined what internal and external control means in cybernetic terms. I found out that these 
are two distinct things, and having more of the one doesn’t necessary increase the other, sometimes 
the opposite is even true. 
I also looked into different models of control in this paper. We can put this in the framework of the 
scope of influence and the way one acts, as discussed in section 3. The scope of influence tells how 
local or global one acts, while the way one acts tells whether one tries to influence the links, methods 
or goals of neighbors. 
The first group of models try to control a whole network, they work globally. The model of 
controllability is an example of this, where one tries to influence the goals of the agents. Another 
example is the model of Emergent Control (Kreyssig & Dittrich, 2011), where they try to achieve a 
global goal by adapting the local rules (methods). We saw that at least in the model of 
controllability, this is difficult to achieve because one has to control almost all the nodes, pushing it 
away from its natural state.  
Other models work locally, they assume the agents want to get control. In the model of self-
organized control, they did this by changing the links they had with other neighbors. This worked, 
under the assumption that the feedback (link weights) wasn’t bound too much. In the second model 
of this kind, agents tried to adapt the methods of their neighbors. This also worked, but there was 
the implicit assumption that goals and methods are separated, which isn’t very realistic.  
 
A general shortcoming of these models is that we assume the goal of an agent is simply to reach a 
certain reference value, while in reality goals are usually far more implicit and multidimensional. It 
might even be better to speak about certain value systems instead of certain goals, where there isn’t 
one optimal solution. But this is more difficult to formalize, and the general principles presented in 
this paper seem to be also true in this case. I.e. that it’s easier to get control over one’s life by acting 
locally, as least as possible disturbing the core values of your environment. It might even be more 
easy to do so in reality, because there are far more possibilities to satisfy one’s values. 
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１ An anarchist is someone who wants to organize society without hierarchy or domination. See for example 
Gelderloos, P. (2010). Anarchy Works for examples and methods of how people organize in an anti-authoritative way. 
２ × and ∏ denotes the Cartesian product of sets. It is used to be able to put all the different coordination inputs (or 
outputs) in one variable. For example, a specific coordination output ci† ∈ Ci† can be seen as a vector (y1,ci1,…,cin). The 
– denotes that it’s input for i, while + denotes that its output.  
３ ∃i means ‘there exists and i (for which …)’ ⩝i means ‘for all i (applies …)’. Thus, in words, stable internal 
coordinability means: there exists an ⵋ, so that for all i it is true that ⵋi  is a solution of Di (ci-), with ci† = ci (ⵋi). 
４ Λ denotes the ‘and’ symbol, thus both conditions should be true. Fi is the function defined in (3). 
５ The symbol ⟵ means that at each time step, the value Xj gets updated into the formula on the right. Thus, at 
each time step, the weighted sum of the value of its neighbors and controllers is added to the value of a node.  
